. Introduction
Philosophy of science has over the past couple of decades-following successful interdisciplinary inquiries in science and technology studies, in particular-taken the concrete local practices of historically contextualized scienti c inquiry much more seriously than more traditional philosophies of science, such as logical empiricism and its follow-ups, including standard versions of scienti c realism and neo-Kantian social constructivism, ever did. Attempts to understand the nature of science have thus shi ed from "global" questions of justi cation, for example concerns with the logical structure of scienti c theories, scienti c inference, and scienti c explanation-concerns arguably culminating in what may be regarded as "transcendental" issues concerning the very possibility of cognitive experience or scienti c knowledge and representation-to more "local" issues of, say, modeling and other epistemic activities whose central cognitive goals and strategies are strongly practice-embedded and even unintelligible without a practical context. is shi , though understandably resisted by traditional philosophers of science fearing the excesses of relativism, is in many ways a welcome one. However, it is very important to realize that the shi from the global to the local is not inevitably a move to a completely non-transcendental approach to science. By developing this point I will, in the following, also argue, at a more general level, for the compatibility and even the mutually enriching potential of the pragmatic and the transcendental perspectives on science.
. e pragmatic and the transcendental I want to begin by arguing that taking local scienti c practices seriously does not automatically mean that one is a resolutely non-Kantian philosopher in one's account of scienti c inquiry. is is because the Kantian or quasiKantian "transcendental" element-whatever it is that must be presupposed for inquiry, representation, or cognition to be possible-may lie in the local practices themselves. is is an insight that may be developed through a Kantian reading of omas Kuhn's work, in particular. Kuhn, a er all, was a major gure-perhaps the most important gure-behind the "practice turn" of contemporary philosophy of science and science and technology studies. (Cf. Kuhn , ; see also Pihlström and Siitonen ) According to Kuhn's well-known statement, the notion of truth, insofar as it has anything to do with the developments of science and scienti c theories, cannot be "extra-theoretical" correspondence but must instead be understood "intra-theoretically" (Kuhn , , -, ) . is does not mean any naïve anti-realism or constructivism, however. ere is a sense in which the world is "experientially given" and "solid", instead of being something that we (or the scientists) simply "make up" (Kuhn , ) . Even in Kuhn's late work, there is, nevertheless, a version of the famous idea of Generally, Kantian transcendental philosophy-following Kant's ( / ) discussion of the necessary conditions for the possibility of cognitive experience-engages in inquiries into necessary conditions for the possibility of certain given human actualities, such as (in addition to experience, Kant's main concern) linguistic meaning (Wittgenstein) or scienti c representation. It is always controversial to read later thinkers as "Kantian" or "transcendental"; my suggestions in this regard must therefore be regarded as provisional and suggestive rather than aiming at historical accuracy. di erent paradigms constituting "di erent worlds" (cf. Kuhn , , ): he does speak about the "world-constitutive" role of human intentionality and mental representations (Kuhn , ) . e world is in some sense constituted or structured, if not literally constructed, by the human mindor, more speci cally, by scienti c theorization and other epistemic activities, both srictly scienti c and more loosely everyday ones.
In this way, Kuhn does seem to argue, early and late, that local scienti c practices are in the business of world-constitution. Indeed, the plausibility of the Kuhnian view of the world-constitutivity of paradigms and intratheoretical truth seems to depend on the availability of a Kantian interpretation and/or reconstruction of Kuhn's occasionally more than just mildly obscure statements. Kuhn himself admitted in his late work that he had developed "a sort of post-Darwinian Kantianism", with "the lexicon" supplying "preconditions of possible experience" in a way analogous to the Kantian categories, yet di ering from the latter by being relative to both time and community (Kuhn , ) . Kuhn should, then, be read as a Kantian with "movable categories" (Kuhn , ) and without any permanently existing things in themselves (see Kuhn , ); his "structured lexicon" and Kant's "a priori" may both, in a relativized sense, be taken to be "constitutive of possible experience of the world" without assuming that they could dictate what that experience must be in any concrete case (Kuhn  ,  ) . Yet, again, something analogous to the Kantian thing in itself must be at work even in Kuhn's system, because "something permanent, xed, and stable" must be what underlies the changes of lexical categories (Kuhn , ); anomalies requiring readjustments in scienti c theories and paradigms could hardly occur at all, if everything there is were simply dependent on or constructed by us. ere is, then, a curious combination of realism and idealism (constructivism) to be found in Kuhn-at least as profoundly as there is such a combination in Kant himself, who famously sought to integrate transcendental idealism with empirical realism and to avoid both dogmatic transcendental realism and skeptical empirical idealism. While the Kuhnian philosopher of science clearly need not employ this Kantian terminology, something like a Kantian vocabulary does seem to be required to make sense of the basic idea of the world being both ("transcendentally") dependent on scienti c practices and ("empirically") independent of them; without a Kantian background this hardly makes sense at all.
For more comprehensive discussions of Kuhn's relation to realism, constructivism, and Kantianism, see, e.g., (Hoyningen-Huene ), (Andersen ) , (Friedman , , ) , and (Sharrock and Read ) . Nothing in my elaborations in this paper depends on getting Kuhn historically right; in particular, I do not want to take any nal stand on the question of whether Kuhn o ers novel ideas in the realism debate or leads us out of Hence, we can now reach a conditional conclusion: if we want to make sense of Kuhn's view, that the way the world is, is paradigm-relative (captured in the slogan that "the world changes" in a scienti c revolution), or the related view that local practices of inquiry play a constitutive role in the emergence of scienti c truths, facts, and objects, we should understand the relevant notions of paradigm-relativity and constitutivity in a (quasi-)Kantian transcendental sense, analogously to the way in which the objects of possible experience are, according to Kant himself, constituted by the categories (that is, the pure concepts of the understanding) and the forms of intuition.
. Kuhn and pragmatism
A key observation at this point is that the kind of Kantian reading of Kuhn sketched in the previous section is not inevitably non-pragmatist. We may, in a broad sense, understand both Kuhn's account of scienti c paradigms and the more general practice-oriented conception of science in contemporary philosophy of science and science and technology studies as "pragmatist". However, pragmatism can be a transcendental approach, too, as soon as we realize that the contextually necessary transcendental conditions for the possibility of cognitive experience (or, better, scienti c representation of objective reality) are themselves practice-laden and historically revisable. While the classical pragmatists-Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and others-were o en highly critical of Kant (just think of James's pronouncement that the path of philosophical progress should be seen as moving from the British empiricists "round Kant", instead of "through Kant", to pragmatism), this is in my view partly based on their possibly somewhat limited self-understanding, as well as their limited understanding of what has proven to be most important and sustainable in Kantian philosophy (see, e.g., Pihlström , , ) . No obvious historical lines of in uence can be traced from the classical pragmatists to Kuhn. However, Kuhn can, arguably, be interpreted-and has been interpreted by Michael Friedman and others-as joining, either explicitly or implicitly, if not those older pragmatists' views, at least the quasipragmatist ideas later made famous by thinkers like Ludwig Wittgenstein and C.I. Lewis (as well as, possibly, Michel Foucault) concerning the historically relative "a priori". Kuhnian paradigms (or lexicons) play this reconceptualized a priori role as enabling (making possible) scienti c representation, and thereby also enabling scienti c objects and truths to emerge from scienti c practices and theorizing. Kuhn's position can, by synthesizing Kantian that debate. and pragmatist insights, be generalized into a more comprehensive version of historicized and naturalized ("pragmatized") transcendental idealism and transcendental philosophy of science. (Cf. Pihlström , ; Pihlström and Siitonen ) Pragmatists more generally should be read as Kantian philosophers in the sense that they also challenged and continue to challenge transcendental realism, the supposition that the world possesses its "own" categorial ontological structure that our schemes and theories, or our science, can be expected to "cut at its joints", i.e., to simply reveal (or to fall short of revealing) "as it is in itself " and that could at least in principle be accurately represented in an absolute theory (and cannot be so represented if we lack an absolute theory).
It is extremely important to give up the apodicticity, unrevisability, and universality of Kantian transcendental principles, in order to re-entangle Kantianism and pragmatism in a way that preserves the constitutive function of those principles. As Friedman ( , ) explains, these principles need not be unrevisable in order to remain "constitutive of the concept of the object of knowledge. " One of the most important versions of this "relative a priori" is Lewis's ( ) theory of the "pragmatic a priori" (cf. Järvilehto ). Its relations to Kuhn's ideas would deserve closer historical and systematic scrutiny.
However, this is not the right place to continue scholarly debates on what pragmatism actually means, either historically or systematically (see, e.g., Pihlström c); nor am I in this paper willing to return to the question of how exactly to write the history of pragmatist philosophy of scienceassuming that there even is such a history to be coherently written (cf. Pihlström ). Clearly, it is not necessary to adopt the concept of pragmatism at all in one's interpretations of either Kuhn or the practice-oriented philosophy of science more generally. Perhaps the label "pragmatism" in the end adds very little to the key idea of focusing on scienti c practices. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the ways in which the realism debate, in particular, have been continued in the pragmatist tradition-and carried on and transformed into a pragmatic shape from the Kantian transcendental tradition-o er illuminating comparisons to Kuhn and many post-Kuhnian philosophers of science who have taken the "practice turn". Joseph Rouse ( ) is one of the interpreters of Kuhn insightfully drawing due attention to Kuhn's role in emphasizing science as a practice. Rouse takes this to mean that Kuhn rejected the traditional epistemological questions of justifying scienti c beliefs. However, while it is certainly correct e modern version of this view, already rejected by Kant, would be "metaphysical realism", rmly rejected by Hilary Putnam and his many followers in the contemporary realism debate. See, e.g., (Putnam , ) .
to note that the traditional issue of epistemic justi cation is not central in Kuhn, this seems to presuppose an unpragmatic dichotomy between practices and beliefs, whereas the more obviously pragmatist response to the traditional questions of justi cation would be the insistence that beliefs are practices-or, as the classical pragmatists themselves o en put it, "habits of action". e view that beliefs are habits of action is one of the fundamental ideas of pragmatism all the way from the initiation of the pragmatist tradition by Charles S. Peirce and William James: beliefs are something on the basis of which we are prepared to act. us, it is somewhat problematic that, a er perceptively pointing out that Kuhn leads us to a shi toward a description of science as an activity (rather than as a product of an activity), Rouse continues to claim that paradigms ought to be understood as "exemplary ways of conceptualizing and intervening in particular situations", instead of being understood "as beliefs (even tacit beliefs) agreed upon by community members" (Rouse , ) . From a pragmatist point of view, we may and should say that it is precisely in virtue of their being "ways of conceptualizing and intervening" that paradigms are also beliefs, or networks of beliefs-or perhaps "webs of beliefs", to employ a Quinean phrase (cf. section below). It is in our goaldirected activities and practices themselves that our ontological ways of taking the world to be in some particular manner are to be located. ere are, and can be, no beliefs at all apart from such activities and practices. Beliefs are inevitably based on practical contexts of inquiry, as the very purpose of inquiry is the xation of belief, or the settlement of a problematic situation, and what this pragmatically involves is the acquisition of a new habit, or a revision of an already established one. Rouse's dichotomies between "practitioners" and "believers" and between "beliefs and forms of life" (Rouse , , ) are, then, simply too unpragmatistic to be helpful in the context of my "transcendentally pragmatist" re-reading of Kuhn (and Kuhnian philosophy of science generally). Scientists, pragmatically speaking, are both practitioners and (hence) "believers".
Accordingly, while Rouse's re ections are generally very helpful in integrating (pragmatic) naturalism with irreducible normativity within scienti c practices (see also Rouse ), he o ers no adequate historical treatment of pragmatism (which, of course, is not to say that he would have to do so. . . ). As a matter of fact, I suggested already some time ago (see Pihlström , chapter ) that Rouse's earlier (Rouse ) proposals for a "postmodernist" philosophy of scienti c practice could at least in part be cashed out in terms of (Deweyan) pragmatism. See also (Pihlström ) .
. Pragmatism as naturalized transcendental philosophy: holism and interdisciplinarity
Pragmatism can, then, be rearticulated as a form of naturalized transcendental philosophy, both generally and in the context of contemporary philosophy of science, in particular. (And Kuhn himself, arguably, was a kind of pragmatist in this sense.) A further interesting analogy, drawn more directly from within the pragmatist tradition, could also be suggested here: Morton White's ( , , ) holistic pragmatism can be seen as a version of the kind of pragmatically naturalized and historicized transcendental philosophy of science that the "local practices" approach in the philosophy of science today could utilize (although White himself might not be entirely satis ed with this characterization). Historical and systematic comparisons between Kuhn and White should be encouraged; very little work has so far been done in this regard. Kuhnian paradigms could be seen as practiceembedded sets of factual and normative assumptions governing inquiry in a given discipline or eld, along the lines of White's holistic pragmatism. Irreducible normativity, which is crucial for scienti c practices to be rationally constrained, is to be found within paradigms themselves, not external to them.
White agreed with W.V. Quine already in the late s and early s that there is no sharp, essentialist dichotomy to be drawn between analytic and synthetic statements (see White ). However, he extended this holism to cover the relation between factual and normative statements, which-in contrast to Quine-he also saw as entangled (White ) ; ultimately, this leads to a comprehensive holistic philosophy of culture in which science as well as ethics, law, and history, among other elds of inquiry, are seen as constituting a single overarching "web" (White ; cf. Pihlström a). is is a web of beliefs as much as a web of practices and activities of inquiry, going very well together with the classical pragmatists' broad notion of inquiry, which covers not only science as conventionally understood but also ethics, politics, and even religion.
Moreover, such "webs" are historically developing entities, also in a way comparable to traditions, which clearly brings them close to Kuhnian paradigms. It is only within such a context-a paradigm, a web, a network-that something can count as a belief that could have a truth-value, as a way the world can be taken to be. So, we are here dealing with a transcendental issue again. e ways in which we are intentionally, experientially, and representationally connected with the world we inquire into through our webs of beliefs and practices are ultimately transcendental. ey enable us to engage in our cognitive endeavors, both scienti c and everyday ones. e world is never just "given" to us independently of such practice-laden, normatively constrained engagements. e webs of beliefs we may act upon are frameworks in terms of which the world can be scienti cally represented.
e concept of interdisciplinary inquiry is particularly crucial here. One might even argue that White's holistic pragmatism itself is not just a philosophical but an inherently interdisciplinary approach to inquiry. e sciences and the humanities, in particular, are parts of the same holistic web of rational inquiry into the world we live in, just like science and ethics are. A holistic pragmatist conception of interdisciplinarity should be able to integrate naturalism (or the legitimate emphasis on the natural sciences and their signi cant achievements) with something like humanistic "constructivism" (human self-interpretation and self-transformation) into a single, yet pragmatically pluralistic and open-ended, image of our rational inquiries into the nature of things, ourselves included. If, when engaging in such inquiries, one is literally surrounded by colleagues representing di erent disciplines, one may also be better equipped to understand one's own inquiry as interdisciplinary; one may even cease to view oneself (or others) as a representative of a single discipline and rearticulate one's own position in the eld of inquiry as irreducibly interdisciplinary. I am not here pretending to know exactly what interdisciplinarity is, or how it should be de ned. One key aspect of the pragmatist and fallibilist rejection of " rst philosophy" (following Quine and White, as well as Kuhn and other practice-oriented philosophers of science) is, in any event, the acknowledgment of the need for deepening interdisciplinarity-not only multidisciplinarity-in our inquiries into the world and ourselves, including our inquiries into what scienti c inquiries themselves are and should be like. One reason why holistic pragmatism is an inherently interdisciplinary approach in these inquiries (as I suggested above) is that pragmatists ought to oppose all dichotomies and boundaries that may "block the road of inquiry" (quoting Peirce's famous words). Traditional disciplinary boundaries may be such blocks. ey may, by blocking the road of inquiry, even block the emergence of certain kinds of scienti c facts or objects that (only) an interdisciplinary paradigm makes possible.
Of course, in practice there may be cases in which it is di cult to determine what exactly interdisciplinarity should mean and how it ought to be promoted in practices of inquiry, or academic institutions. For example, in interdisciplinary research institutions, in practice at least three alternative "readings" of the requirement to promote interdisciplinarity, signi cantly varying in strength, might be implemented. (i) Each individual scholar and/or research project might be required to be internally interdisciplinary (though possibly there can be degrees in the strength of their interdisciplinarity).
us, no scholar or research project should, according to this formulation, represent just a single academic discipline but would have to represent at least two (or, perhaps preferably, more).
(ii) According to a somewhat weaker interpretation, an individual scholar and/or project could represent just one discipline, but they would have to be open to interdisciplinary relations to other disciplines. ere would thus have to be interdisciplinary potential in a research proposal, even though it would not have to be internally interdisciplinary. (iii) Only the interdisciplinary research institution as a whole would, according to the weakest interpretation, be required to be truly interdisciplinary. is would allow individual scholars and/or their projects to be even relatively strictly "disciplinary", but their combination would be expected to be such that (perhaps unexpected) interdisciplinary cooperation might grow out of it. (I am not saying, of course, that these three options exhaust all the alternative formulations of interdisciplinarity.)
Now, how should the correct strength of the interdisciplinarity expectation (either in the case of an individual or in the case of a community of scholars) be determined? Does pragmatism, e.g., White's holistic pragmatism or Kuhnian practice-oriented philosophy of science, help us in this regard?
ere is no immediate answer to the question of how strong interdisciplinarity pragmatism should promote. On the contrary, this is itself a contextually pragmatic matter, to be determined through a holistic critical consideration of the practices in question, in relation to other practices forming our cultural "web", as well as the purposes of the inquiry we are engaging in.
e pragmatic value of interdisciplinarity should, moreover, always be relativized to the aims and goals of the particular inquiry (or practice) thus contextually and holistically considered. An obvious example of philosophical interdisciplinarity is the debate over naturalism-a debate to which pragmatists since Dewey have made major contributions and to which Rouse ( ) o ers one of the most balanced reactions in the contemporary discussion-which cannot be settled independently of a vast variety of other philosophical and metaphilosophical issues, ethical and political ones included.
At this point of our discussion, it goes without saying that wide-ranging philosophical issues such as naturalism and interdisciplinarity are, in my view, also "transcendental" issues in the reinterpreted pragmatic sense explicated above. ey are in the end issues concerning our being able to meaningfully represent reality. Furthermore, it has sometimes been suggested that, far from there being a sharp separation between the humanities and the natural sciences, all sciences are actually "human sciences". Natural sciences like physics are themselves oriented to the world on the basis of human interests and needs. ese are not "nature's own" perspectives-recall again not just Kuhn but Kant and the classical pragmatists, too-but, inescapably, human ones. ey are, as much as the traditional humanities, expressions of human self-interpretation. is is also something that pragmatists attracted by White's holistic pragmatism could and should spell out in more philosophical detail, while including philosophy-as well as metaphilosophyitself in the practice-embedded web of beliefs to be holistically tested. Science is part of human culture, and when critically examining the normative structures of academic practices of inquiry, we already operate within holistic pragmatism, ultimately evaluating the "uni ed whole" of human culture more generally, i.e., our ways of being in the world and categorizing and inquiring into the world in and through the cultural practices we have developed and are continuously developing.
. Scienti c realism?
At least one major philosophical question remains to be considered: scienti c realism. As I have suggested above, pragmatism can, generally, be understood as synthesizing something like transcendental idealism (in its naturalized and historicized, thus contextually relativized, reincarnation) with empirical realism. is is a further indication of its deep commitment to a Kantian approach in the project of conceptualizing our cognitive and representational relations to reality. It should, thus, be easy to appreciate both the Kantian and the pragmatist aspects of not only Kuhn's conception of science but also, say, Putnam's internal realism (cf. Putnam , ) . In the realism debate, there is, of course, a wide variety of di erent views to consider-almost all of which must simply be ignored here. For instance, how exactly the pragmatist and Kantian elements of what I have called "pragmatic realism" (cf., e.g., Pihlström ) might be incorporated in the slightly di erent position known as "practical realism" (Vihalemm ) remains to be discussed elsewhere. I suppose that Rein Vihalemm's practical realism di ers from my approach in being more distant from the Kantian transcendental concerns-and therefore in a sense "more realistic" (and at least not idealistic even in a reinterpreted sense). Yet, it seems to me that a very basic transcendental issue concerning the practice-laden representability and experienceability of reality must be taken up from the perspective of practical realism, too: according to Vihalemm's practical realist, scienti c objects can, a er all, only be identi ed within scienti c practices. us, it would seemat least this rearticulation should be available to the "Kantian pragmatist"-that practices provide transcendental (contextual) conditions for the possiis interpretation and elaboration of White's holistic pragmatism is more comprehensively developed in (Pihlström a).
bility of there being scienti cally representable objects at all-for us. is also sounds very much like Dewey's (e.g., ) view that scienti c objects are not "ready-made" prior to inquiry but rather arise out of, or are constructed and/or identi ed in the course of, inquiry.
In addition, it must be observed that the problem framework of scienti c realism raises issues not just concerning the traditional opposition between realism and idealism (today reconceived as the debate between realism and constructivism) but also concerning the ones between realism and relativism (compare the discussion of the "relativized a priori" above in section ) and even realism and nominalism. I have commented on these issues, also in relation to the philosophy of science and its history-with the particular goal of understanding better the development of pragmatist philosophy of science in the twentieth century-on a number of earlier occasions (e.g., Pihlström , b) , so I will be very brief and selective here. In the case of the realism vs. nominalism dispute, which might seem to be relatively far removed from the central issues in contemporary philosophy of science (it sounds more than slightly medieval, does not it?), the crucial question for a pragmatic realist and transcendental pragmatist is this: is there a viable analogy of (pragmatic) transcendental idealism and empirical realism when it comes to the special issue of realism about universals (or what Peirce called "real generals", e.g., laws and habits) and/or modalities, both of which are crucially important in an adequate conception of scienti c inquiry as an inquiry into something "real"? In previous works (Pihlström , ) , I have o ered a pragmatic-constructivist (albeit naturalized transcendental) account of Peircean "real generals", acknowledging their reality but interpreting this reality only in a practice-and discourseinternal sense-that is, as something ultimately humanly "constructed" (cf. also, e.g., Margolis
). e key idea here is that real generals, such as natural laws and dispositions, must be postulated in order to make sense of the scienti c pursuit of truth, including truth about general laws and regularities, but this is nevertheless our human way of making sense of-or inquiring into what we nd necessary conditions for the possibility of-our practices of inquiry. Now, while something like this is certainly a philosophical view of real generals tting "local" practice-oriented philosophy of science and science and technology studies-a realism about real generals that is analogous to "mere" empirical realism and therefore well compatible with transcendental idealism or constructivism (pragmatism)-we must still pause to re ect For more details, see Peirce's early and late writings on "real generals"-all the way from the late s to --collected in (Peirce -) . For references to relevant scholarship, see also (Pihlström , chapter ) .
on whether the position we have arrived at is plausible or even coherent. Stronger Peircean realists may argue that pragmatism itself, given its method of focusing on the "conceivable practical e ects" of our ideas, concepts, conceptions, and theories, presupposes in a more full-blown sense the basic commitments of what Peirce called "extreme scholastic realism", i.e., realism about generality, including modalities. is is, arguably, because a realistic interpretation of possibility, in particular, is needed in order to account for "conceivable practical e ects". e conceivable e ects our ideas may have include e ects never concretely realized in actuality.
is sounds heavily metaphysical but is in fact a vital issue for pragmatist philosophy of science, too, not just for pragmatist metaphysics. Are, for instance, physical or chemical laws and other structures Peircean-like "real generals"? If so, is it plausible to claim that they are still somehow transcendentally dependent on our inquiry, in a (pragmatically reinterpreted) Kantian-like sense? Are natural laws, in particular, nomically necessary in a realistic sense; are they also "real generals"? And even if they are, are not they also metaphysically (as well as, of course, logically) contingent, as the law-like structure of the world could presumably have been very di erent from what it de facto is? What is, furthermore, the relation between scienti c representations (contextualized in our inquiries) and the laws that are from the point of view of our scienti c theories claimed to "really" obtain in the world?
ese issues remain open here; in any event, my general proposal is that real generals can and should be regarded not as features of the world an sich-any more than our theories or representations can ever be about things in themselves, either according to Kant or according to Kuhn-but as features of the-world-as-seen-through-the-practices-of-inquiry (whatever that ultimately concretely means). For example, physical or chemical structures could be seen as both real (that is, as real generals independent of our representations in an empirical sense) and as constructed (that is, as practice-or paradigm-relative, or at least identi able only within practices or paradigms, in the pragmatically naturalized transcendental sense). More work clearly needs to be done here.
One way of pragmatically "cashing out" the idea that what there is depends on our epistemic and representational activities and practices of inquiry-or, in Kuhnian terms, on our paradigms-and the related idea of inis is not the proper place to inquire into the meaning of the pragmatic method or pragmatic maxim, rst formulated by Peirce in his essay, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (reprinted in Peirce -, vol. ) , and later employed by James, among others (see especially James , chapter ). For an updated discussion, see the relevant contributions to (Pihlström c) .
tegrating transcendental idealism (constructivism) with empirical realism, through pragmatism, is what I have elsewhere called the "contextualization of scheme-(in)dependence" (see Pihlström b) . e basic idea here is that nothing is scheme-or practice-(or paradigm-) dependent or -independent as such, "in itself ", but only in one or another context of practice-driven inquiry. Hence, the contextuality and relativity of a priori principles (cf. section above) is in a way taken to the meta-level of philosophical interpretations of transcendental philosophy and the notions of scheme-or practicedependence and scheme-independence themselves.
Even so, the question concerning realism about generality, particularly about real possibilities and other modalities, must be le unresolved here. Philosophers of science o en nd it necessary to invoke irreducibly modal notions in order to make sense of the idea that the world could be, or could have been, structured in terms of quite di erent practice-embedded theories and paradigms than the ones we actually have at our disposal. Somehow modalities must already be incorporated in practices themselves, so it is not enough to simply say that a (moderately) realistic interpretation of modalities is just based on our practices. A er all, practices are contexts within which things can be done in certain ways-or occasionally le undoneand this clearly means that they are, in Peircean terms, "generals". So are Kuhn's paradigms. So are any contexts that can play the transcendental role of pragmatically enabling scienti c representation of objects, in the sense outlined in the early sections of this paper.
. Conclusion e relevance of all this relatively abstract and general discussion to both the interdisciplinary eld of science and technology studies (or other practiceoriented re ections on the nature of science) and to special elds within the philosophy of science, e.g., the philosophy of chemistry, of biology, or of the social sciences, must remain implicit. However, the general issue of realism and the questions concerning the pragmatic naturalizability of transcendental approaches to that issue could presumably easily be illustrated in terms of more speci c problems drawn from current discussions in these elds.
For example, Rom Harré's suggestion that the world, "prior to" conceptualization and measurement (or the application of an apparatus of investigation), is somehow a world of "affordances", potentialities, or powers, comes close to a view admitting Peircean real generals. However, Harré emphasizes that these potentialities are not exactly "in" the world itself prior to its being subjected to an investigation involving our apparatuses; they are properties of "the world plus the apparatus". is makes his view clearly pragmatic (yet, in my view, also transcendental). I am indebted to many discussions at the Tartu workshop for being able to appreciate these connections.
Pragmatism, I have tried to argue in this paper (and in some more detail, albeit in somewhat di erent contexts, in several previous publications), is a highly promising philosophical (and metaphilosophical) perspective in these inquiries, but it needs both updating in terms of interdisciplinary, "localized" investigations of scienti c practices (e.g., from the perspective of science and technology studies as a "successor" of traditional philosophy of science) and Kantian backing, or what might be called "retranscendentalization". We must not forget that, even when dealing with "local" issues of the identi ability of objects within practices and the roles that our practices and/or paradigms (may) play in the constitution of reality as knowable and representable by us we are dealing with transcendental topics. Philosophy of science does not, and must not, give up those fundamental traditional concerns simply by turning pragmatic and non-foundationalist; through that turn it merely reinterprets them in novel ways.
